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Crossing	the	Divide:	Tradition,	
Rupture,	and	Modernity	in	
Revolutionary	Russia		
Andy	Willimott	and	Matthias	Neumann		‘Revolution’—it	has	been	all	but	forgotten—was	originally	an	astronomical	term,	denoting	 the	 revolving	 motion	 of	 the	 planets.	 This	 was	 a	 process	 with	 no	beginning	 and	 no	 end,	 distinctly	 characterised	 by	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 telos.	 The	word	 was	 not	 understood	 in	 the	 modern	 sense,	 as	 a	 sudden	 or	 fundamental	turnover	in	the	politics	of	state	or	the	overthrow	of	an	established	government	and	 social	 order.	 Indeed,	when	 the	 term	was	 first	 introduced	 to	 the	 sphere	 of	politics	in	the	seventeenth	century,	it	could	still	have	a	very	opposite	meaning	to	the	 one	 it	 has	 today.	 The	 ‘Glorious	 Revolution	 of	 1688-89’—the	 usurping	 of	 a	Catholic	monarch	and	the	return	of	a	Protestant	to	the	English	throne—was	so	called	because	it	marked	an	attempt	to	return	to	an	old	system,	a	cyclical	journey	back	 to	a	preordained	order.	 It	was	essentially	restoration.	 In	 turn,	 it	has	been	explained,	what	 some	 have	 labelled	 the	 English	 Revolution—the	 overthrow	 of	monarchy	 in	 1640s—was,	 at	 the	 time,	 actually	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘the	 Great	Rebellion’.1	But,	as	historians	of	 this	period	have	recently	shown,	 the	definition	of	 ‘revolution’	 was	 not	 fixed.	 In	 truth,	 the	 word	 ‘revolution’	 was	 already	developing	 multiple	 and	 conflicting	 meanings	 from	 the	 sixteenth	 century	onward,	 making	 room	 for	 new	 interpretations	 and	 sowing	 the	 seeds	 for	 our	current	understanding	of	the	word.2			
																																																								1	Tim	Harris,	‘Did	the	English	Have	a	Script	for	Revolution	in	the	Seventeenth	Century?’,	Scripting	
Revolution:	A	Historical	Approach	to	the	Comparative	Study	of	Revolutions	Eds.	Keith	Michael	Baker	&	Dan	Edelstein,	(Stanford,	CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	2015),	25-40.	2	See	Baker	&	Edelstein	(eds.),	Scripting	Revolution,	chaps.	1-3.	NB.	This	volume	also	contains	a	chapter	by	Ian	D.	Thatcher,	‘Scripting	the	Russian	Revolution’	(213-227),	highlighting	the	range	of	‘scripts’	from	which	1917	was	born.	This	can	be	seen	to	extend	on	the	some	of	the	same	intellectual	concerns	discussed	in	the	present	book,	as	it	assesses	1917	as	far	more	than	the	actions	of	a	revolutionary	leadership	bound	by	the	ideas	of	Marx.	
The	 fundamental	 semantic	 shift	 between	pre-modern	 and	modern	 conceptions	of	 ‘revolution’	 was	 very	 much	 linked	 to	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 French	 and	American	 Revolution.	 During	 these	 two	monumental	 events,	 the	 revolutionary	actors	of	 the	 time	 initially	pursued	 to	 ‘restore	 the	old	order	of	 things	 that	had	been	 disturbed	 and	 violated	 by	 the	 despotism	 of	 absolute	 monarchy	 or	 the	abuses	 of	 colonial	 power.’3	However,	 soon	 they	 had	 to	 realise	 that	 restoration	was	 impossible	and	began	 to	advocate	completely	new	 ideas	and	programmes.	Our	modern	concept	of	revolution	was	born	in	this	way	and,	as	Hannah	Arendt	remarked,	was	‘inextricably	bound	up	with	the	notion	that	the	course	of	history	suddenly	begins	anew,	 that	an	entirely	new	story,	a	story	never	known	or	 told	before,	 is	 about	 to	 unfold	 (…).’4	This	 notion	 remains	 essential	 to	 the	 popular	understanding	of	revolution	and	it	is	at	the	very	heart	of	modern	revolutionary	discourse.	 However,	 the	 actuality	 of	 revolutionary	 upheavals	 in	modern	 times	tells	us	a	very	different	story.	Time	and	again,	successful	revolutionaries	 found	themselves	 unable	 to	 totally	 destroy	 and	 overcome	 the	 cultural	 conceptions,	traditions,	and	customs	that	underpinned	the	previous	regime.	In	a	metaphorical	sense	 conceivably	 suited	 to	 sixteenth-century	 sensibilities,	 ‘Revolution’	 might	thus	 be	 better	 understood	 as	 the	 upturning	 of	 the	 soil	 during	 ploughing—a	world	 being	 turned	 upside-down,	 with	 the	 ‘new’	 establishing	 its	 roots	 in	 the	decomposing,	but	still	fertilising,	‘old’.				This	presents	us	with	an	apt	image	when	considering	developments	in	the	study	of	the	Russian	Revolution.	Recent	studies	have	encouraged	us	to	view	1917,	and	the	 Soviet	 republic	 that	 emerged	 out	 of	 this	 episode,	 as	 germinations	 from	Russia’s	 broader	 experience	 of	 modernity.	 Scholars	 of	 modern	 Russian	 and	Soviet	 history	 do	 not	 deny	 that	 the	 events	 of	 1917	 conform	 to	 our	 present	understanding	 a	 modern	 revolution.	 This	 was,	 after	 all,	 a	 year	 that	 saw	 the	overthrow	of	monarchy,	 the	 implementation	of	 a	new	 type	of	 government,	 the	rejection	 of	 an	 old	 social	 order,	 and,	 ultimately,	 the	 dawning	 of	 a	 socialist	republic.	 What	 is	 more,	 those	 driving	 forth	 change	 in	 Russia	 at	 this	 time	consciously	associated	their	actions	with	a	modern	revolutionary	script	that	had																																																									3	Hannah	Arendt,	On	Revolution	(London:	Penguin	Books,	1990),	44.	4	Ibid.,	28.	
emerged	out	of	 the	French	Revolution	 in	1789.	But,	all	 the	same,	scholars	have	increasingly	 come	 to	 question	 whether	 we	 were	 too	 quick	 to	 swallow	 the	rhetoric	of	the	Bolsheviks,	who,	upon	seizing	power,	were	inclined	to	view	their	actions	 as	 part	 of	 an	 entirely	 new	 epoch—the	 turning	 of	 a	 new	 leaf	 in	 human	history.	The	suggestion	now	is	that	our	focus	on	1917	as	a	caesura	has	served	to	blind	us	to	the	full	array	of	factors	that	helped	make	the	world’s	first	avowedly	socialist	 state.	 Put	 simply,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 1917	 is	 the	 wrong	departure	point	for	a	full	analysis	of	the	social,	cultural,	political,	and	economic	development	of	the	Bolshevik	project	and	Soviet	socialism.			Leading	 the	charge	 for	something	more	akin	 to	a	 longue	durée	 approach	 to	 the	study	of	 the	Russian	Revolution	 from	 the	 early	 2000s	was	 a	 group	of	 scholars	who	 soon	 became	 known	 collectively	 as	 the	 modernity	 school.	 In	 a	 series	 of	essays	 brought	 together	 by	 Yanni	 Kotsonis	 and	 David	 Hoffmann	 around	 this	time,	 Russian	 Modernity,	 contributors	 stressed	 that	 late	 Imperial	 and	 Soviet	Russia	were	often	 subject	 to	 the	 same	pan-European	developments	 in	modern	statecraft.	Noting	that	the	‘history	of	modern	Russia	has	been	written	as	a	history	distinct	 from	 that	of	 “the	West”,’	 the	 editors	of	 this	 volume	 rejected	what	 they	saw	 as	 the	 tendency	 to	 treat	 Russia	 as	 an	 ‘other’,	 or,	 more	 specifically,	 the	tendency	to	cast	her	outside	the	framework	of	modern	European	development.5	Hoffman,	 in	 particular,	 was	 keen	 to	 place	 Russia	 inside	 an	 Enlightenment	trajectory	understood	to	 foster	an	 ‘ethos	of	progressive	social	 intervention	and	the	 rise	 of	 mass	 politics’.6	Others	 pointed	 to	 universal	 modern	 developments	taking	 root	 in	 Russia,	 such	 as	 the	 rise	 of	 mass	 politics,	 public	 and	 political	movements,	 expanding	 scientific	 discourses,	 and	 growing	 state	 intervention.		These	 and	 other	 features	 of	 modernity—including	 industrialization,	 literacy	campaigns,	 urbanization,	 and	 secularization—were	 traced	 across	 1917	 as	 a	means	 of	 presenting	 late	 Imperial	 Russia	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 as	 practicing	modern	entities.																																																											5	Yanni	Kotsonis	&	David	L.	Hoffmann	(eds.),	Russian	Modernity:	Politics,	Knowledge,	Practices	(New	York,	NY:	Macmillan	Press,	1999).	6	Hoffmann,	‘European	Modernity	and	Soviet	Socialism’	in	Russian	Modernity,	esp.	246-247.	
Inspired	by	Stephen	Kotkin’s	work	on	Stalinism	and	popular	engagements	with	a	state-idealized	national	identity,	some	contributors	also	sought	to	show	how	‘the	internalization	 of	 authority’—be	 it	 late	 Imperial	 autocracy	 or	 one-party	dictatorship—was	 a	 further	 ‘hallmark’	 of	 the	modern	 experience.7	Attempts	by	ordinary	 individuals	 to	 situate	 themselves	 within	 modern	 political	 and	ideological	developments	was	cited	as	a	‘mode	of	thinking’	that	had	roots	in	the	Enlightenment,	 and	 certainly	 became	more	 pronounced	 under	 the	 teleological	pronouncements	of	Marxism.8	Implicit	within	 this	pan-European	approach	was	the	belief	 that	past	 interpretations	of	 the	Russian	Revolution	were	reductionist	and,	 in	 some	 cases,	 prone	 to	 encouraging	 the	 fetish-ization	 of	 Russian	‘otherness’.	 The	modernity	 school	was	 challenging	 historians	 to	 broaden	 their	contextual,	geographical,	and	chronological	scope	when	it	came	to	studying	the	Russian	Revolution	and	the	Bolshevik	project	in	general.			In	 his	 book,	Making	War,	 Forging	Revolution,	 Peter	 Holquist	 went	 on	 to	 write	about	the	period	1914-1921	as	a	‘continuum	of	crisis’	in	which	the	mechanisms	of	a	modern	state—mass	mobilization,	state	intervention,	attempts	at	social	and	political	engineering,	and	population	surveillance—all	came	to	the	fore	in	Russia.	Bolshevik	 statecraft	was	 thus	 shown	 to	 fit	 into	 a	 pan-European	 narrative	 that	extended	 across	 and	 evolved	 through	 1917.9		 Likewise,	 in	Drafting	 the	Russian	
Nation,	 Joshua	 Sanborn	 wrote	 about	 the	 modern	 methods	 of	 conscription,	mobilization,	and	mass	politics	exhibited	by	both	the	Russian	Imperial	and	Soviet	armies	between	1905	and	1925.	He	showed	how	each	army	functioned	as	agents	of	 social	 transformation,	even	 if	 their	 ideologies	 spoke	 to	different	end	goals.10	Daniel	Beer	subsequently	traced	 ‘the	genesis	of	 the	Bolshevik	understanding	of	their	inheritance’	through	a	study	of	the	human	sciences	in	Russia	between	1880	and	 1930.	 In	 his	 book,	 Renovating	 Russia,	 Beer	 highlighted	 the	 various																																																									7	See	Stephen	Kotkin,	Magnetic	Mountain:	Stalinism	as	a	Civilization	(Berkeley,	CA:	University	of	California	Press,	1997),	esp.	chap	5.		NB.	Kotsonis	refers	to	such	developments	as	the	‘hallmark	of	modernity’	in	his	introduction	to	Russian	Modernity,	(1-16).	8	See	Hoffmann,	in	Russian	Modernity,	esp.	246-250.	9	Peter	Holquist,	Making	War,	Forging	Revolution:	Russia’s	Continuum	of	Crisis,	1914-1921	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2002),	1-6.	10	Joshua	A.	Sanborn,	Drafting	the	Russian	Nation:	Military	Conscription,	Total	War,	and	Mass	
Politics,	1905-1925	(DeKalb,	IL:	Northern	Illinois	University	Press,	2003).	
intellectual	discourses	and	modern	principles	that	were,	in	one	way	or	another,	appropriated	 or	 absorbed	 by	 the	 Bolshevik	 leadership,	 helping	 to	 set	 the	cognitive	parameters	of	the	Russian	Revolution.	He	showed	that	a	programme	of	social	engineering	first	espoused	by	Russian	liberals	came	to	inform	the	radical	agenda	 of	 the	 Bolshevik	 regime.	 In	 particular,	 Beer	 argued,	 the	 developing	disciplines	of	psychiatry,	psychology,	criminology,	anthropology,	 jurisprudence,	and	sociology	can	be	seen	to	advance	the	idea	that	it	was	possible	to	rationalize	society	through	the	power	of	science	and	reason.11	In	this	sense,	what	separated	the	 scientism	 and	 progressivism	 of	 a	 liberal	 regime	 from	 that	 of	 a	 totalitarian	regime	was	‘the	factor	of	extent’—the	extremes	to	which	one	set	of	leaders	were	willing	to	go	when	employing	the	logic	of	modern	progression.12			This	 is	modernity	as	a	 fundamental	belief	 in	 the	perfectibility	of	humanity	and	the	 tools	 of	 human	 management.	 It	 is	 an	 approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 modern	Russian	 and	 Soviet	 history	 that	 came	 of	 age	 under	 the	 growing	 intellectual	influence	of	social	theorists	such	as	Zygmunt	Bauman,	who,	across	the	late	1980s	and	 1990s,	 had	 argued	 that	 while	 modern	 civilization	 did	 not	 make	 the	Holocaust	 inevitable,	 it	 did	 make	 the	 Holocaust	 possible,	 with	 its	 managerial	procedures	and	perverse	eugenic	programme.13	This	thinking	was	buttressed	in	the	late	1990s	by	works	such	as	Mark	Mazower’s	Dark	Continent,	which	showed	the	underbelly	of	modernity	in	Europe,	popularizing	a	vision	of	European	history	that	refused	to	portray	progressivism	or	progressive	politics	in	a	wholly	positive	light.14	This	was	a	time	when	accepted	political	and	ideological	boundaries	were	challenged	in	the	search	for	those	deeper,	more	elemental	connections	affecting	the	 sweep	 of	 history.	 It	 was	 a	 time	 when	 scholars	 focused	 on	 the	 tone	 of	twentieth-century	 history,	 not	 just	 its	 policies.	 And	 such	 thinking	 continues	 to	resonate,	with	Sanborn	calling	on	historians	to	view	the	period	of	1914-1922	not	as	a	break	with	the	tsarist	past,	but	as	‘the	zenith	of	Russian	progressivism’—the																																																									11		Daniel	Beer,	Renovating	Russia:	The	Human	Sciences	and	the	Fate	of	Liberal	Modenrity,	1880-
1930	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	2008),	on	influencing	the	Bolsheviks	and	the	Bolshevik	programme,	see	esp.	chap.	5.	12	Beer,	Renovating	Russia,	3-4.	13	Zygmunt	Bauman,	Modernity	and	the	Holocaust	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	1989),	92.	14	Mark	Mazower,	Dark	Continent:	Europe’s	Twentieth	Century	(London:	Penguin	Books,	1998).	
moment	 that	 bequeathed	 to	 the	 early	 Soviet	 regime	 ‘centralized	 welfare,	institutionalized	science,	and	the	general	belief	 that	scientific	attempts	 to	solve	social	problems	were	both	appropriate	and	necessary’.15	In	this	case,	revolutions	are	also	understood	to	be	about	tone	as	well	as	policy.		There	can	be	little	doubt	that	the	modernity	school	has	had	a	profound	impact	on	the	study	of	Russian	and	Soviet	history.	But	that	is	not	to	say	that	the	ideas	and	work	associated	with	this	school	have	escaped	criticism.	Indeed,	as	we	will	see,	the	most	 convincing	 criticisms	have	 tended	 to	 relate	 to	 the	modernity	 school’s	early	neglect	of	variation	and	indeterminacy	when	writing	the	history	of	Russia’s	modern	 experience.	 As	 is	 the	 case	 in	 many	 other	 fields	 of	 historical	 enquiry	today,	 where	 once	 historians	 used	 to	 write	 the	 history	 of	 ‘Great	 Men’—the	Russian	 Revolution	 told	 as	 the	 story	 of	 Lenin’s	 genius,	 for	 instance—we	 have	perhaps	come	too	close	to	privileging	the	history	of	‘Great	Ideas’	over	all	else.16	In	 other	words,	 if	we	 focus	 on	 the	 power	 of	 ideas	 and	modern	 frameworks	 in	isolation	we	are	likely	to	obscure	the	full	picture.	Or,	put	another	way,	now	that	our	ears	are	open	to	the	tones	of	modernity,	we	must	seek	to	better	account	for	the	manner	of	their	entry	into	the	world.			
Historiographical	Divisions:	‘Modernity’	vs.	‘Neo-traditionalism’		With	many	early	modernity	school	scholars	coming	out	of	Columbia	University	in	 the	1990s,	overtly	crediting	 the	 influence	Stephen	Kotkin	as	 they	did	so,	 the	emerging	fault	lines	of	Soviet	historiography	in	the	West	took	on	an	institutional	dimension.	 Some	of	 the	 first	 criticisms	of	 the	modernity	paradigm	came	out	of	Chicago,	 where	 the	 close-reading,	 archive-driven	 approach	 instilled	 in	 Sheila	Fitzpatrick’s	graduate	students	made	many	sensitive	 to	 the	broader	arguments																																																									15	Joshua	A.	Sanborn,	‘The	Zenith	of	Russian	Progressivism:	The	Home	Front	during	World	War	I	and	the	Revolution’,	in	Russia’s	Home	Front	in	War	and	Revolution,	1914-22.	Book	2:	The	
Experience	of	War	and	Revolution	(eds.)	Adele	Lindenmeyr,	Christopher	Read,	and	Peter	Waldron	(Bloomington,	IN:	Slavica,	2016),	497-507.	Also	note	David	L.	Hoffman,	Cultivating	the	Masses:	
Modern	State	Practices	and	Soviet	Socialism,	1914-1939	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornel	University	Press,	2011).	16	Andy	Willimott,	Living	the	Revolution:	Urban	Communes	&	Soviet	Socialism,	1917-1932	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2017)	21.	
and	 intellectual	 influences	 associated	with	 the	 Columbia	 cohort	 at	 that	 time.17	The	‘Chicago	approach’	was	itself	a	methodological	preoccupation	that	emerged	out	of	 the	historiographical	disputes	of	 the	1960s	and	1970s,	when	Fitzpatrick	helped	 to	 initiate	 the	 revisionist	 school,	which	 rejected	 a	 cold	war	 scholarship	that	spoke	of	 totalitarianism,	Soviet	 totalitarian	systems,	and	totalitarian	 ‘Great	Men’	without	much	recourse	to	documentation.	With	the	Soviet	Union	often	still	existing	 in	 the	 public	 imagination	 in	 evil	 caricature,	 it	 is	 not	 hard	 to	 see	 why	there	 remained	 a	 desire	 to	 ‘dig	 deeper’,	 to	 look	 beyond	 systems	 of	 power	 and	continue	to	extend	on	a	social	history	that	revelled	in	revealing	nuance.			Where	revisionists	had	advocated	the	virtues	of	social	history,	with	its	focus	on	class	 relations	 and	 the	 social	 environment,	 the	modernity	 school,	 buoyed	 by	 a	new	 intellectual	 climate	being	driven	by	 the	 likes	 of	Bauman,	were	 inclined	 to	reject	 all	 social	 heuristic	 categories	 in	 favour	 of	 complete	 reconceptualization.	What	happened	next,	as	Ronald	Grigor	Suny	observed,	was	that	those	inclined	to	nuance	 and	 ‘attentive	 to	 the	 insights	 of	 Max	Weber’	 started	 to	 highlight	 ‘neo-traditionalist	 aspects	 of	 the	 Soviet	 experience	 that	 denied	 or	 contradicted	 the	move	to	a	generalized	modernity’.18	The	German	sociologist	Weber	had	famously	argued	that	traditional	cultural	influences	continued	to	shape	the	modern	world	through	 religion,	 habits,	 and	 customs;	his	The	Protestant	Ethic	and	the	Spirit	of	
Capitalism	(1905)	making	a	case	for	the	continued	impact	of	religion	on	workers	and	 the	Western	 capitalist	 system,	 for	 instance.	The	historians	Matthew	Lenoe	and	 Terry	 Martin	 were	 among	 the	 first	 to	 press	 the	 case	 for	 the	 continued	relevance	 of	 such	 structuralist	 readings	 of	 Soviet	 history,	 highlighting	 the	unreformed	social	practices	and	systems	of	favour	underlining	human	behaviour	within	 new	 Soviet	 institutions.	 Lenoe	 disputed	 the	 importance	 attributed	 to	transformational	projects	and	enlightenment	discourses	in	his	book,	Closer	to	the	
Masses,	which	offered	an	investigation	into	Soviet	print	media.	He	argued	that	as	the	media	moved	to	help	mobilize	the	population	for	the	First	Five-Year	Plan,	the																																																									17	Lewis	H.	Siegelbaum,	‘Whither	Soviet	History?	Some	Reflections	on	Recent	Anglophone	Historiography’,	Region:	Regional	Studies	of	Russia,	Eastern	Europe,	and	Central	Asia	vol.	1,	no.	2	92012):	213-230.	18	Ronald	Grigor	Suny,	‘Reading	Russia	and	the	Soviet	Union	in	the	Twentieth	Century:	How	the	‘West’	Wrote	Its	History	of	the	USSR,’	in	Cambridge	History	of	Russia	vol.	3:	The	Twentieth	
Century,	(ed.)	Suny	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	5-66,	esp.	60.	
‘mass	 enlightenment	 project’	 gave	 way	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	 hierarchical	structures	 based	 around	 cadre-class	 status.19 	Likewise,	 within	 his	 carefully	researched	 book	 on	 nationalism	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 The	 Affirmative	 Action	
Empire,	Martin	defended	Nicholas	Timasheff’s	‘Great	Retreat’	paradigm.	This	was	a	thesis,	first	proclaimed	in	1946,	that	sharply	differentiated	Stalinism	from	early	Soviet	 socialism;	an	assessment	 that	modernity	school	 scholars	had	 labelled	as	misbegotten.20			The	 neo-traditionalist	 approach	 was	 itself	 not	 without	 problem.	 First	 and	foremost,	 the	 terms	 ‘tradition’	 and	 ‘neo-traditional’	 were	 applied	 in	 an	ahistorical	manner.	 Taking	 their	 cue	 from	Andrew	G	Walder’s	Communist	Neo-
traditionalism,	 Ken	 Jowett’s	New	World	Disorder,	 and	 the	 social	 sciences	 of	 the	1980s,	 Lenoe	 and	Martin	 used	 these	 terms	 to	 denote	 ‘dependence,	 deference,	and	 particularism’.	 The	 notion	 of	 ‘charismatic	 authority’,	 as	 espoused	 by	 Max	Weber—the	 idea	 that	 political	 authority	 rested	 on	 the	 perceived	 legitimacy	 of	the	leader—seemed	to	underlie	many	of	the	assumptions	within	these	accounts.	But	 this	was	 also	 ‘dependence,	 deference,	 and	 particularism’	 understood	 in	 an	apophatic	sense.	That	is,	as	not	 ‘independence,	contract,	and	universalism’—the	usual	markers	of	western	liberal	modernity.	The	accent	seemingly	on	the	retreat	from	‘full’	modernity,	defining	something	by	stating	that	which	it	is	not.	In	other	words,	 ‘modernity’	 was	 being	 used	 as	 a	 normative	 category.	 As	 such,	 the	emergent	 neo-traditional	 school	 did	 not	 chart	 the	 development	 of	 traditional	forces	 in	Russia	and	 the	Soviet	Union	 so	much	as	 it	 sought	 to	 identify	political	practices	common	or	specific	to	the	Communist	regime.	In	the	grand	scheme	of	things,	such	an	approach	clearly	has	its	limitations.	But	it	has	encouraged	us:	1)	to	 take	more	 heed	 of	 the	 unintended	 consequences	 and	 specific	 application	 of	modern	formulas;	2)	to	question	some	of	the	most	sweeping	assertions	made	by																																																									19	Matthew	Lenoe,	Closer	to	the	Masses:	Stalinist	Culture,	Social	Revolution,	and	Soviet	Newspapers	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2004),	esp.	chap.	5.	20	Terry,	Martin,	The	Affirmative	Action	Empire:	Nations	and	Nationalism	in	the	Soviet	Union	1923-
1939	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornel	University	Press,	2001),	esp.	26-27.	See	Nicholas	S.	Timasheff,	The	Great	Retreat:	The	Growth	and	Decline	of	Communism	in	Russia	(New	York:	E.	P.	Dutton	&	Company,	1946).	Cf.	David	L.	Hoffmann,	Stalinist	Values:	The	Cultural	Norms	of	Soviet	Modernity,	1917-1941	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	2003),	esp.	1-14;	and	[historiography	special]	‘Ex	Tempore	Stalinism	and	the	“Great	Retreat”,’	Kritika:	Explorations	in	Russian	and	Eurasian	History	vol.	5,	no.	4	(2004):	651-733.	
modernity	school	scholars;	and,	when	taken	in	conjunction	with	other	trends	in	the	 field,	 3)	 to	 again	 consider	 further	 comparison	 with	 other	 Communist	countries.				And,	 as	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 scholarly	 debate,	 these	 criticisms	 and	 objections	 have	driven	further	study,	investigation,	and	reassessment.	The	crux	of	the	matter,	it	was	 becoming	 clear	 to	 more	 and	 more	 scholars,	 was	 the	 gap	 between	 Soviet	intentions	and	implementation.	Suny,	for	instance,	suggested	that	scholars	start	to	 view	 modernity	 as	 ‘a	 context’.	 That	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 it	 predetermined	historical	action;	rather,	that	it	provided	‘an	environment	in	which	certain	ideas,	aspirations,	 and	 practices	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 find	 support	 than	 others’.21		 The	British	scholar	David	Priestland,	more	removed	from	the	institutional	dynamic	at	play	within	these	historiographical	developments,	went	on	to	both	criticise	and	combine	elements	of	neo-traditional	and	modernity	school	thinking	in	his	book,	
Stalinism	and	the	Politics	of	Mobilization.	As	he	saw	it:	both	approaches	‘capture	important	 aspects	 of	 Stalinist	 thinking,	 and	 both	 are	 valuable	 in	 relating	Bolshevik	 ideas	 to	 broader	 discourses	 and	 political	 cultures.	 Yet	 neither	convincingly	 accounts	 for	 the	 Terror’.22	So	 Priestland	 set	 out	 to	 delineate	 an	explanation	 of	 Stalinism	 that	 included	 both	 ‘eschatological	 concern	 with	establishing	the	perfect	society’	and	‘Romantic	interest	in	the	role	of	non-rational	forces’.23	He	 saw	 both	what	 he	 called	 an	 Enlightenment-driven	 ‘technicist’	 and	Romantic	‘revivalist’	strand	to	Bolshevik	thinking.24	The	two	together—and	only	together—could	 explain	 the	 various	 twists	 and	 turns	 of	 Stalinism	at	 any	 given	time.			The	 seeds	of	 such	a	 reassessment,	 as	Michael	David-Fox	has	pointed	out,	were	present,	if	at	times	overshadowed,	in	the	work	of	scholars	who	might	have	been	more	 closely	 associated	 with	 one	 or	 other	 of	 the	 neo-traditionalist	 and	
																																																								21	Ronald	Grigor	Suny,	‘On	Ideology,	Subjectivity,	and	Modernity:	Disparate	Thoughts	about	Doing	Soviet	History’,	Russian	History/Histoire	russe	vol.	33,	nos.	1-4	(2007):	1-9,	quotations	9.	22	David	Priestland,	Stalinism	and	the	Politics	of	Mobilization:	Ideas,	Power,	and	Terror	in	Inter-
war	Russia	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007),	14.	23	Priestland,	Stalinism,15.	24	Priestland,	Stalinism,	37	
modernity	 schools. 25 	Responding	 to	 the	 developing	 debate	 about	 the	 gap	between	 intention	 and	 implementation,	 Lynne	 Viola,	 who	 was	 sceptical	 as	 to	whether	scientism	or	the	goal	of	social	engineering	could	explain	Soviet	history,	nonetheless	argued	that	Bolshevik	visions	of	state	intervention	developed	in	line	with	what	 James	Scott	called	 ‘high	modernism’,	and	that	where	hyper-planning	and	unintended,	chaotic	enactment	met	was	where	the	characteristics	of	Soviet	state	 management	 were	 formed.26 	In	 turn,	 Holquist	 highlighted	 that	 ‘there	existed	not	only	a	gulf	between	utopian	planning	and	messy	realization,	but	the	two	 were	 intrinsically	 related’.27	As	 David-Fox	 explained,	 this	 was	 a	 dialectic	vision	 of	 the	 Soviet	 encounter	 with	 modernity,	 whereby	 a	 ‘hatred	 of	backwardness	 and	 unbound	 faith	 in	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state	 led	 to	 inevitable	failure	of	grandiose	plans,	which	was	then	blamed	not	on	the	approach	itself	but	on	 recalcitrance	 and	 backwardness,	 thus	 perpetuating	 the	 cycle’.28	Succinctly	summarising	this	exchange,	David-Fox	noted	that	the	‘scholar	who	so	brilliantly	analysed	 the	 gulf	 between	 planning	 and	 implementation	 invoked	 high	modernism;	 the	modernist	 scholar,	 in	 response,	 pointed	 to	 persistent	 Russian	factors’.29	Lest	we	 forget,	 schools	 of	 thought	 always	 exist	 better	 in	 abstraction,	and	they	rarely	resort	to	full-blown	entrenchment	for	long.		In	his	authoritative	surveying	of	the	field,	David-Fox	has	also	pointed	to	the	fact	that	one	long-term	issue	in	particular	has	coloured	our	perception	or	approach	to	 recent	historiographical	debates:	 the	 issue	of	particularism	vs.	universalism.	This	old	chestnut,	it	seems,	has	both	consciously	and	unconsciously	occupied	the	minds	 of	 Russian/Soviet	 historians	 for	 a	 many	 years. 30 	At	 various	 stages,	scholars	have	been	driven	 to	 incorporate	Russia	within	or	 excise	her	 from	 the	‘normative’	 path,	 to	 standardize	 or	 exceptionalize	 her	 social	 and	 political																																																									25	Michael	David-Fox,	Crossing	Borders:	Modernity	Ideaology,	and	Culture	in	Russia	and	the	Soviet	
Union	(Pittsburgh,	PA:	University	of	Pittsburgh	Press,	2015),	44-45.	26	Lynne	Viola,	‘The	Aesthetic	of	Stalinist	Planning	and	the	World	of	the	Special	Villiages’,	Kritika	vol.	4,	no.	1	(2003):	101-128.		See	also	James	Scott,	Seeing	Like	a	State:	How	Certain	Schemes	to	
Improve	the	Human	Condition	Have	Failed	(New	Haven,	NY:	Yale	University	Press,	1998).	27	Peter	Holquist,	‘New	Terrains	and	New	Chronologies:	The	Interwar	Period	through	the	Lens	of	Population	Politics’,	Kritika	vol.	4,	no.	1	(2003):	163-175.	28	David-Fox,	Crossing	Borders,	45.	29	David-Fox,	Crossing	Borders,	45.	30	David-Fox,	Crossing	Borders,	22.	
construction.	 In	 many	 ways,	 this	 historiographical	 tendency	 extended	 on	Russia’s	 own	 nineteenth-century	 political	 debates,	 which	 often	 divided	 along	‘Westernizer’	 and	 ‘Slavophile’	 lines.	 And	 because	 one	 can	 associate	 political	messages/connotations	with	these	historiographical	approaches,	to	build	on	the	scholarly	research	or	ideas	of	either	has	the	potential	to	pique	scepticism,	even	if	historians	were	attempting	to	move	beyond	such	preoccupations.			Be	 it	 particularism	vs.	 universalism,	 exceptional	 vs.	 synchronous,	 or	 continuity	vs.	discontinuity,	 then,	David-Fox	is	right	to	argue	that	binary	oppositions	have	defined	the	‘terrain	in	which	interpretations	of	Russian	and	Soviet	history	have	revolved	until	 the	present	day’.	 In	 response	 to	 this	 observation,	David-Fox	has	proposed	 a	 ‘third	 way’.	 Instead	 of	 associating	 modernity	 or	 normative	development	with	 the	West,	 he	 argues,	we	 should	 look	 at	 late	 Imperial	 Russia	and	the	Soviet	Union	through	the	prism	of	what	S.	N.	Eisenstadt	called	‘multiple	modernities’. 31 	That	 is,	 to	 differentiate	 between	 westernization	 and	modernization,	 to	 reject	 the	 notion	 that	modernity	means	 the	 ‘convergence	 of	industrial	 societies’,	 and	 to	 look	 at	 the	 ‘cultural	 program	 of	 modernity’	 as	experienced	 in	 different	 ‘civilizational	 traditions’	 and	 contexts.32		 This	 is	 an	approach	 that	 looks	 to	 pluralize	 the	 concept	 of	 modernity,	 to	 move	 beyond	Eurocentric	 accounts,	 and	 to	 allow	 for	 different	 cultural	 interpretations	 of	modernity.	 If	 we	 approach	 the	 study	 of	 Russian	 and	 Soviet	 history	 on	 these	terms,	 it	 might	 encourage	 us	 to	 better	 account	 for	 the	 manner	 of	 Russia’s	embrace	with	modernity.	It	might	enable	us	to	better	explain	the	various	twists	and	 turns	 of	 modern	 Russia	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union.	 And,	 much	 as	 Priestland	attempted	 with	 his	 study	 of	 Stalinism,	 it	 might	 bring	 neo-traditional	 and	modernity	 school	 research	 together	 to	 build	 a	 more	 coherent	 and	 convincing	picture.				Moving	in	this	direction,	some	might	prefer	to	employ	the	language	of	‘entangled	modernities’,	which,	in	recent	years,	has	been	offered	as	both	a	complement	and																																																									31	David-Fox,	Crossing	Borders,	3,	24	32	See	Shmuel	Noah	Eisenstadt,	‘Multiple	Modernities’,	Daedalus	vol.	129,	no.	1	(2000):	1-29,	quotations	24.	
corrective	to	Eisenstadt’s	reworked	conception	of	modernity.33	Those	employing	‘entangled	 modernities’,	 in	 place	 of	 ‘multiple’	 or	 ‘alternative’,	 have	 sought	 to	further	remove	themselves	from	Eurocentric,	singular,	or	bastardised	visions	of	modernity;	 instead,	 stressing	 the	 ‘imbrications	 of	 modernity	 and	 tradition’	 in	their	various	settings:	a	framework	that	points	to	the	interweaving	of	competing	narratives,	including	modernity	and	anti-modernity,	as	well	as	different	cultural	contextualizations	of	the	past	and	future.34	From	this	perspective,	modern	ideas	can	be	seen	to	interact	with	certain	cultural	contexts,	and—as	the	recent	boom	in	global	 history	 and	 comparative	 history	 has	made	 all	 the	more	 obvious—these	particular	interactions	could	also	set	their	own	precedents	and	serve	to	influence	other	 nations	 and	 their	 experience	 of	 modernity.	 For	 example,	 the	 specific	imperial	 context	 and	 domination	 out	 of	 which	 the	 Russian	 and	 Chinese	revolutions	 emerged,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested,	 further	 explains	 some	 of	 the	modernizing	 strategies	 and	 governmental	 patterns	 of	 twentieth-century	Communism.35		
Crosspollinations:	New	and	Old,	Universal	and	Particular		In	 the	 same	 vein,	 rather	 than	 accepting	 the	 binary	 conception	 of	 ‘change	 and	continuity’	so	often	at	 the	heart	of	historical	studies,	 the	editors	of	 this	volume	argue	 that	 the	 old	 and	 the	 new—the	 residual	 and	 the	 emergent—will	 often	intersect,	together	forming	and	effecting	the	formation	the	world	around	us.	As	accounts	of	1917	continue	to	be	written,	it	is	clear	that	historians	have	begun	to	focus	more	attention	on	the	nature	of	the	Russian	Revolution	and	what	made	it	the	way	it	was.	Boundaries	and	chronologies	continue	to	be	challenged.	Indeed,	with	this	in	mind,	it	might	be	said	that	we	are	all	modernists	now.	But	studies	on	the	 Russian	 public	 sphere	 and	 civil	 society	 (obshchestvennost’),	 in	 particular,	have	 also	moved	 beyond	 the	 narrow	 focus	 of	modern	 state	 practices	 and	 new	professions,	allowing	room	for	added	nuance	and	‘civilizational	traditions’.	Thus																																																									33	Johann	P.	Arnason,	‘Entangled	Communisms:	Imperial	Revolutions	in	Russia	and	China’,	
European	Journal	of	Social	Theory	vol.	6,	no.	3	(2003):	307-325,	esp.	307-308.	34	Göran	Therborn,	‘Entangled	Modernities’,	European	Journal	of	Social	Theory	vol.	6,	no.	3	(2003):	293-305,	esp.	295-297.	35	Arnason,	‘Entangled	Communisms:	Imperial	Revolutions	in	Russia	and	China’,	307-325.		
our	 eyes	 have	 been	 opened	 to	 the	 particular	 nature	 of	 Russian	 civil	developments,	with	the	very	word	obshchestvennost’—often	translated	as	‘civic-mindedness’—also	 seen	 to	 encapsulate	 or	 build	 on	 a	 vision	 of	 society	more	 in	keeping	 with	 Russian	 sensibilities.	 That	 is,	 a	 collectivist,	 as	 opposed	 to	 an	individualist	 society,	 or	 a	 society	 inclined	 to	 foster	 ‘an	 individual’s	 primary	loyalty	to	the	larger	community’.36	In	this	way,	modern	civic	patterns	can	be	seen	to	develop	in	culturally	specific	and	idiosyncratic	ways.	Members	of	the	Imperial	
obshchestvennost’	 were	 meant	 to	 reject	 soslovie	 (estate)	 particularism—the	notion	 that	 you	 belong	 exclusively	 to	 the	 nobility,	 clergy,	 townspeople,	 or	 the	peasantry—by	embracing	an	all-imperial	identity.	And,	crucially,	such	visions	of	civic	 organization	 have	 themselves	 been	 shown	 to	 help	 set	 the	 parameters	 of	Soviet	social	activism.37			Examining	 themes	 such	 as	 this	 complicates	 and	 problematizes	 our	understanding	 of	 Soviet	 Russia.	 	 Late	 Imperial	 culture	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 having	undergone	 deep	 transformational	 changes	 that	 saw	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 small,	culturally	specific,	yet	thriving	civil	and	civic	society,	as	well	as	the	beginnings	of	a	 Russian	 mass	 consumer	 culture.	 The	 Great	 Reforms	 of	 Aleksandr	 II,	accelerating	 urbanization	 and	 state-sponsored	 industrialization,	 as	 well	 as	 an	increased	interest	in	Russian	national	culture,	also	facilitated	a	mushrooming	of	philanthropic,	 educational,	 cultural,	 and	 recreational	 organizations	 across	Imperial	 Russia. 38 	And	 it	 is	 in	 this	 urban	 context	 that	 the	 concept	 of	
obshchestvennost’	came	to	the	fore,	connecting	the	past	and	the	present,	ensuring	that	the	forces	of	Russian	modernity	were	enacted	through	recognizable	means.	Subsequently,	we	can	now	see	that	certain	social	activities	fell	under	the	banner	of	 Soviet	 obshchestvennost’	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 cultural,	 social,	 and	intellectual	 conceptions	 acquired	 in	 the	 build	 up	 to	 1917.	 Soviet																																																									36	Catriona	Kelly	and	Vadim	Volkov,	‘Obshchestvennost’,	Sobornost’:	Collective	Identities’,	in	
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obshchestvennost	 provided	 an	 instrument	 to	 integrate	 a	 very	 fragmented	population	 into	the	new	state,	allowing	Soviet	citizens	to	actively	participate	 in	the	process	of	state-building.	39		Consider	 also,	 some	 of	 the	 latest	 studies	 into	 the	 world	 of	 Russian/Soviet	activists	 and	 would-be	 revolutionaries.	 Those	 that	 formed	 the	 first	 urban	communes	 of	 the	 new	 republic,	 for	 instance—the	 young	 idealists	 who	requisitioned	 dormitory	 rooms	 and	 apartments	 in	 order	 to	 established	 living	examples	 socialist	 domesticity—who	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 enact	 their	 modern	revolutionary	 aspirations	 within	 a	 certain	 ‘civilizational	 tradition’.	 Banding	together	 as	 early	 as	 1918,	 groups	 averaging	 between	 three	 and	 six	 persons	formed	 these	 expressly	 collective	 cohabitative	 units	 as	 a	means	 of	 introducing	socialism	 into	 everyday	 life.	 As	 they	 did	 so,	 they	 pooled	 all	 their	 money	 and	resources	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 their	 commitment	 to	 equality;	 they	 established	 rotas	 to	ensure	 domestic	 chores	 were	 shared	 and	 gender	 norms	 challenged;	 they	introduced	 Taylorist	 timetabling	 and	 monitored	 schedules	 as	 a	 means	 of	promoting	 ‘rational’	 and	 ‘productive’	 lifestyles;	 they	 stridently	 defined	themselves	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	parental	 home,	with	 its	 patriarchal	 tendencies	and	pointless	bric-a-brac;	and	they	mimicked	Soviet	workers’	clubs	by	creating	‘red	 corners’	 dedicated	 to	 reading,	 study,	 and	 enlightenment	 activities.	 Taking	their	cue,	 in	many	cases,	 from	the	Soviet	youth	 journals	and	newspapers,	 these	activists	 wanted	 to	 implement	 modern	 socialist	 visions	 in	 the	 here	 and	 now.	‘Once	the	preserve	of	the	inconsequential’,	they	strove	to	elevate	domesticity	and	the	management	of	everyday	life	to	a	 ‘science’.40	In	this	they	built	on	a	broader	modern	trend	to	‘rationally’	reform	everyday	life—an	idea	also	seen	in	the	West,	with	the	rise	of	liberal	ergonomic	designs	for	the	home,	Lillian	Gilbreth’s	guide	to	a	productive	 life	and	mind,	 taking	Taylorism	 into	 the	home	and	psychology,	as	well	 as	 a	 swathe	 of	 radical	 visions	 for	 centralized	 services.41		 But,	 at	 the	 same																																																									39	Matthias	Neumann,	The	Communist	Youth	League	and	the	Transformation	of	the	Soviet	Union,	
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time,	we	can	see	that	these	urban	activists	openly	acknowledged	a	rich	heritage	of	Russian	collective	organization:	 some	commune	groups	making	 reference	 to	the	 example	 of	 the	 pre-revolutionary	 arteli	 (small	 labour	 alliances),	 radical	student	kruzhki	(discussion	circles),	clandestine	political	iacheiki	(cells),	and	the	literary	 visions	 of	 Nikolai	 Chernyshevsky’s	What	 Is	 to	 Be	 Done?	 (1863).	 All	 of	which	drew	on	a	cultural	and	revolutionary	lexicon	that	privileged	the	idea	of	the	
kollektiv	 (collective)	 as	 a	 small,	 concentrated	 unit	 or	 brotherhood—a	 radical	vision	born	of	a	society	inclined	to	foster	 ‘an	individual’s	primary	loyalty	to	the	larger	community’.			Some	 urban	 communes	 established	 rather	 grand	 sounding	 ‘committees’	 to	monitor	 and	 manage	 certain	 everyday	 tasks,	 including	 ‘housekeeping’	 and	‘hygiene	 committees’.	 Communes	 were	 also	 keen	 to	 compare	 themselves	 to	others,	keeping	note	of	the	various	lifestyle	studies	printed	in	the	press,	and	the	statistics	 that	 accompanied	 them.	 As	 with	 the	 formation	 of	 commune	‘committees’,	 to	 measure	 life	 through	 ‘statistics’,	 and	 on	 occasion	 to	 produce	your	own	 ‘data’	 and	 ‘tables’,	was	 to	 speak	 the	 language	of	modern	 socialism.42	But,	it	has	also	been	argued,	‘people	do	not	just	conceive	ideas	through	external	frameworks,	 they	 transfer	 onto	 them	 their	 own	 idiosyncrasies	 and	 that	 with	which	they	feel	familiar’.43	Collective	association	in	the	form	of	the	Soviet	urban	commune	gained	traction	with	individual	activists,	in	part,	because	it	resonated	with	something	that	they	felt	was	culturally	familiar.	Some	commune	members,	for	 instance,	 had	 direct	 experience	 of	 peasant	 community	 life	 and	 the	 mir	(peasant	 commune),	 which	 had	 long	 been	 associated	 with	 egalitarianism	 and	communal	habits.	And	whether	or	not	the	Russian	countryside	really	lived	up	to	this	acclaim,	and	the	importance	bestowed	upon	it	by	the	Russian	intelligentsia	of	 the	nineteenth	century	 in	particular,	 it	 certainly	did	help	 to	 foster	a	cultural	legacy	 that	put	 the	accent	on	community,	 equality,	 sharing,	 and	brotherhood.44	As	such,	Russia’s	collectivist	and	cultural	antecedents	can	be	seen	to	help	effect	
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the	manner	by	which	modern	socialist	ambitions	came	into	being,	giving	added	traction	to	certain	approaches	and	building	on	existing	cultural	conceptions.45			In	 turn,	 some	of	 the	 chapters	 in	 this	 volume	 seek	 to	 show	how	modern	 forces	were	 enacted	 through	 individuals,	 groups,	 and	 institutes	 still	 subject	 to	 the	durable	beliefs,	practices,	and	emotions	of	their	forefathers.	In	all	of	this,	we	are	beginning	 to	move	 beyond	 the	 binary	 of	 ‘modernity	 vs.	 tradition’,	 and	 explore	how	 contemporaries	 encountered	 revolutionary	 change	 within	 a	 particular	cultural	context.				
	
	
Rethinking	the	Russian	Revolution	
	As	a	means	of	marking	the	latest	historiographical	developments	within	the	field	on	the	centenary	of	the	Russian	Revolution,	this	book	offers	a	series	of	chapters	in	which	historians	seek	 to	show	how	a	non-binary,	across-1917	approach	can	be	deployed	to	offer	new	insights	into	a	range	of	topics.	The	contributors	to	this	book	 analyse	 the	 transformation	 of	 Russia,	 over	 1917,	 as	 an	 open-ended	process—a	 history	 of	 interactions,	 entanglements,	 and	 vicissitudes	 across	 the	revolutionary	divide.	In	their	own	way,	they	examine	how	the	new	and	the	old,	modern	 aspirations	 and	 traditional	 structures,	 intersected	 to	 make	 the	 Soviet	world.	 As	 historiographical	 trends	 continue	 to	 lead	 us	 to	 consider	 and	incorporate	 the	longue	durée,	as	well	as	 the	crosspollination	of	global	and	 local	issues,	 these	 chapters	 offer	 students	 and	 scholars	 something	 both	modest	 and	important:	 further,	yet	much	needed,	examples	of	 research-led	enquires	across	1917.	This	is	important	because	so	much	Soviet	historiography,	and	many	of	the	debates	surrounding	the	modernity	school	paradigm,	have	fallen	on	the	topic	of	Stalinism.	 As	 the	 editors	 of	 the	 leading	 journal	 Kritika	 noted	 in	 2003,	 Soviet	
																																																								45	See	a	similar	comment	on	this	research	in	David-Fox,	Crossing	Borders	116-117.	
history	in	recent	years	might	well	have	been	referred	to	as	‘1930s	studies’.46	But	by	 looking	 at	 change,	 continuity,	 and	 crosspollination	 across	 1917	 more	specifically	we	can	gain	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	factors	that	helped	form	the	Russian	Revolution,	the	Bolshevik	project,	and	the	Soviet	Union.			What	 these	chapters	do	not	offer	 is	a	 single,	 comprehensive	account	of	how	to	read	or	rethink	the	Russian	Revolution.	Instead,	they	each	come	at	this	task	from	different	 angles	 and	 with	 different	 concerns.	 Some	 allocate	 more	 time	 to	 the	shadows	 of	 Russia’s	 past	 than	 others.	 Some	 draw	 more	 overtly	 on	 certain	historiographical	 examples	 than	 others.	 But,	 in	 the	 end,	 all	 come	 together	 to	question	 the	 manner	 of	 Russia’s	 march	 towards	 modern	 socialism	 and	 the	manner	by	which	modern	visions	were	appropriated.			Broadly	 speaking,	 we	 can	 see	 three	 main	 areas	 of	 concern	 or	 intellectual	influence	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 crossing	 the	 revolutionary	 divide	 of	 1917.	 Firstly,	there	 is	 the	desire,	very	much	 leading	on	 from	the	challenges	 laid	down	by	the	modernity	school,	to	highlight	the	connection	between	Russia’s	late	Imperial	and	Soviet	experience	of	modernity.	This	continues	to	extend	the	lessons	of	thinkers	such	as	Bauman,	but	also	the	greatly	influential	and	frequently	referenced	Michel	Foucault,	who	also	challenged	existing	preconceptions	of	 the	modern	world	by	citing	the	processes	by	which	individuals	are	made	and	identities	formed,	what	he	 called	 ‘subjectivity’,	 as	 an	 important	 aspect	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 modern	systems	of	power	and	civilizational	 cohesion.47	Looking	at	 the	means	by	which	identities	were	 fashioned,	and	how	 individuals	envisioned	 their	own	 identities,	can	 draw	 us	 nearer	 to	 both	 the	 universal	 and	 particular	 experiences	 of	modernity	in	Russia.	The	study	of	subjectivity	in	the	field	of	Russian	and	Soviet	history	 was	 first	 broached	 in	 earnest	 in	 Stephen	 Kotkin’s	Magnetic	Mountain,	which	 noted	 the	 work	 of	 Foucault	 and	 argued	 that	 ‘Stalinism	 was	 not	 just	 a	political	system,	let	alone	the	role	of	an	individual.	It	was	a	set	of	values,	a	social	
																																																								46	‘From	the	Editors:	“1930s	Studies”,’	Kritika:	Explorations	in	Russian	and	Eurasian	History	vol.	4,	no.	1	(2003):	1-4.	47	See	‘The	Subject	and	Power’,	afterword	to	Hubert	Dreyfus	and	Paul	Rabinow,	Michel	Foucault:	
Beyond	Structuralism	and	Hermeneutics	(Chicago,	IL:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1982).	
identity,	a	way	of	life’.48	The	idea	of	a	Stalinist	or	Soviet	subjectivity	was	followed	up	 Jochen	 Hellbeck	 and	 Igal	 Halfin,	 who	 each	 sought	 to	 show	 how	 a	 state-controlled	 ‘official	 discourse’	 shaped	 Soviet	 citizens	 and	 their	 attempts	 to	 self-fashion.49	But	 this	 is	 also	 an	 area	 that	 needs	 further	 research	 and	 a	 clearer	explanation	of	what	parallels	 or	disjuncture	 could	be	 experienced	 across	1917	and	 across	 Russia’s	 broader	 experience	 of	 modernity.	 Pointing	 to	 the	 role	 of	Communist	 state	 indoctrination	 programmes	 with	 regard	 to	 subjectivity,	Stephen	 A.	 Smith	 has	 recently	 argued	 that	 identities	 can	 develop	 along	 axes	other	 than	 those	determined	by	 the	 state.50	If	we	are	 to	 fully	understand	 these	not	entirely	malleable	identities,	therefore,	we	need	to	look	at	the	possible	points	of	connection	between	axes.			Secondly,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 see	 the	 conscious	 use	 of	 history	 and	 the	 past	 as	 a	means	 of	 explaining	 or	 framing	 the	 pre-revolutionary	 patterns	 of	 the	 Soviet	world.	Here	we	 see	 the	 influence	 of	 Eric	Hobsbawn	 and	Terence	Ranger’s	The	
Invention	 of	 Tradition,	 which,	 setting	 its	 sights	 predominantly	 on	 twentieth-century	 nationalism	 and	 nationalists,	 sought	 to	 reveal	 the	 creative	 nature	 of	‘tradition’.	 Queen	 Victoria’s	 jubilee	 of	 1887,	 subsequently	 repeated	 due	 its	success,	 drew	 on	 the	 theme	 of	 royal	 tradition,	 but	 was,	 in	 fact,	 a	 wholly	 new	invention;	an	 invention	 that	would	be	emulated	by	 the	Habsburgs	 in	1908	and	the	 Romanovs	 in	 1913.51	Hobsbawn	 and	 Ranger	 wrote	 about	 ‘tradition’	 as	 a	conscious	‘process	of	formalisation	and	ritualization,	characterized	by	reference	to	 the	 past’.	 They	 did	 not	 fully	 account	 for	 the	 unconscious	 use	 of	 the	 past,	custom	as	precedence,	or	the	idea	of	cultural	familiarisation;	nor	was	there	much	room	 for	 indeterminacy	 in	 their	 assessment.	 Nonetheless,	 extending	 on	 this																																																									48	22-23.	49	See	Jochen	Hellbeck,	Revolution	on	My	Mind:	Writing	a	Diary	Under	Stalin	(Cambridge	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	2006);	and	Igal	Halfin,	From	Darkness	to	Light.	Class,	
Consciousness	and	Salvation	in	Revolutionary	Russia	(Pittsburgh:	University	of	Pittsburgh	Press,	2000);	Igal	Halfin,	Stalinist	Confessions.	Messianism	and	Terror	at	the	Leningrad	Communist	
University	(Pittsburgh:	University	of	Pittsburgh	Press,	2009);	Igal	Halfin,	Intimate	Enemies.	
Demonizing	the	Bolshevik	Opposition,	1918-1928	(Pittsburgh,	PA:	University	of	Pittsburgh	Press,	2007);	Igal	Halfin,	Terror	in	my	Soul:	Communist	Autobiographies	on	Trial	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2003).	50	Stephen	A.	Smith,	Revolution	and	the	People	in	Russian	and	China:	A	Comparative	History	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008),	235.	51	Eric	Hobsbawn	and	Terence	Ranger	(eds.),	The	Invention	of	Tradtion	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1983),	7,	281-281.	
work,	David	Brandenberger	has	deployed	 the	 concept	of	 the	 ‘usable	past’	with	great	effect	in	his	assessment	of	the	Soviet	state	and	Stalinism.	He	has	shown	that	the	 Soviet	Union	was	 forced	 to	 seek	 out	 and	 draw	on	 a	 ‘usable	 past’	 precisely	because	 of	 the	 weaknesses	 and	 indeterminacies	 within	 its	 indoctrination	programme.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 Soviet	 state	 failed	 to	 mobilize	 society	 along	communist	 lines,	 meaning	 it	 had	 to	 infuse	 nationalist	 sentiment	 and	 Russian	tradition	 into	 its	 propaganda	 message.52 	In	 this	 sense,	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 is	presented	as	a	modernist	project	reinforced	by	a	‘heroic	line	…	drawn	from	the	Russian	national	past’.53	More	room	is	given	to	both	the	indeterminacy	of	Soviet	propaganda	 and	 the	 restraints	 of	 the	 Bolshevik	 project.	 But	 more	 work	 still	needs	to	be	done	to	uncover	how	the	‘usable	past’	was	incorporated	in	the	lives	of	ordinary	Soviets,	while	avoiding	some	of	more	deterministic	assertions	made	by	Hobsbawn	and	Ranger.			Thirdly,	there	is	a	case	to	be	made	that	some	of	the	themes	raised	in	structuralist	arguments—if	 we	 reject	 the	 more	 restrictive,	 unambiguous,	 and	 overly	deterministic	 explanations	 associated	 with	 this	 approach—can	 still	 yield	important	insights	into	modern	Russia	and	the	Soviet	Union.	In	short,	this	might	be	viewed	as	the	search	for	contemporary	priori.	But	where	structuralist	studies	into	 the	 Soviet	 past	 can	 be	 criticised	 for	 failing	 to	 adequately	 historicize	 their	nominated	priori,	 including	Edward	Keenan’s	attempt	 to	explain	Soviet	history	through	the	loosely	defined	notion	of	‘Muscovite	tradition’	or	‘Muscovite	political	folkways’,	 today’s	 research	 must	 try	 to	 explain	 how	 cultural	 traditions	 or	contexts	 persisted	 and	 interacted	 with	 new	 developments	 to	 form	 a	 Soviet	experience.54	This	is	a	vision	of	structuralism	that	can	be	seen	to	critically	extend	on	Marshall	 Sahlins’	memorable	 Islands	 of	History,	 which	 used	 the	 example	 of	islander	encounters	with	alien	visitors	or	conquerors	to	argue	that	the	‘dialogue’	between	 new	 influences	 and	 existing	 contexts	 is	 what	 shapes	 the	 way	 we	
																																																								52	David	Brandenberger,	Propaganda	State	in	Crisis:	Soviet	ideology,	Indoctrination,	and	Terror	
under	Stalin,	1927-1941	(New	Haven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press,	2011).	53	David	Brandenberer,	‘”Simplistic,	Pseudo-Socialist	Racism”:	Ideological	Debates	within	Stalin’s	Creative	Intelligentsia,	1936-39’,	Kritika	vol.	13,	no.	2	(2012):	365-393,	quotation	367.		54	Edward	L.	Keenan,	‘Muscovite	Political	Folkways’,	The	Russian	Review	vol.	45,	no.	2	(April,	1986):	115-181.	
interpret	 the	 world.55	So,	 the	 ‘British	 were	 to	 Hawaiians	 in	 general	 as	 the	Hawaiian	chiefs	were	to	their	people’	because	culturally	specific	perceptions	of	power	persisted,	ensuring	that	 ‘chief-commoner	relations’	thereafter	developed	along	 both	 European	 and	Hawaiian	 lines.	 As	 such,	 Sahlin	 insisted,	 ‘there	 is	 no	such	thing	as	immaculate	perception’.56				More	recently,	William	H.	Sewell,	a	scholar	of	modern	France	and	social	theory,	has	 also	 made	 a	 case	 for	 studying	 the	 interaction	 between	 new	 ‘events’	 or	‘happenings’	and	the	various	‘cultural	schemas’	that	might	be	seen	to	constitute	the	established	‘structures	of	social	life’.57	In	one	aside,	Sewell	notes	that	micro-history	offers	one	way	to	study	such	interactions.58	Despite	coming	under	attack	from	some	quarters,	then,	the	growth	in	micro-history	and	thematically	focused	studies	over	recent	years	may	well	help	to	facilitate	a	means	of	more	accurately	explaining	grand	structural	influences	and	historical	trajectories.59			Sewell	 argues	 that	 where	 historians	 have	 traditionally	 sought	 to	 explain	 the	sequence	 of	 events	 and	 trends,	 viewing	 the	 passage	 of	 time	 as	 contingent	 by	nature,	 the	 structuralism	 of	 the	 social	 sciences	 tended	 to	 go	 in	 search	 of	 the	things	 that	 determine	or	pattern	 time.	One	has	been	more	 concerned	with	 the	sequence	 of	 events	 as	 a	 means	 of	 explaining	 the	 world,	 viewing	 time	 as	irreversible	 and	 embracing	 circumstance;	 the	 other	has	 sought	 to	discover	 the	logic	behind	social	and	political	developments.	But,	Sewell	suggests,	elements	of	structural	 thinking,	 when	 combined	 with	 an	 historian’s	 ‘emphasis	 on	 culture,	contingency,	 and	 agency’,	 can	 help	 to	 explain	 how	 certain	 influences	 are	reproduced,	 accelerated,	 reversed,	 and/or	 reoriented	 over	 time	 and	 across	
																																																								55	Marshall	Sahlins,	Islands	of	History	(Chicago,	IL:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1985),	esp.	143-145.	56	Sahlins,	Islands	of	History,	138-139,	147.	57	William	H.	Sewell	Jr.,	Logics	of	History:	Social	Theory	and	Social	Transformation	(Chicago,	IL:	University	of	Chicago	Press),	143.	58	Sewell,	Logics	of	History,	74-75.	59	Cf.	Jo	Guldi	and	David	Armitage,	The	History	Manifesto	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014).	This	publication	has	rather	misguidedly	incorporated	micro-history	and	close	studies	as	the	product	of	an	academy	that	has	become	overrun	by	short-termism,	neglecting	the	broader	implications	and	insights	offered	by	such	work,	while	also	assuming	short	and	long-term	studies	do	not	speak	to	one	another	or	work	to	advance	historical	scholarship	as	a	whole.	
events.60		There	has	been	 some	movement	 in	 this	direct	 in	 the	 field	of	Russian	and	 Soviet	 history,	 some	 studies	 consciously	 engaging	 in	 theoretical	pronouncements;	 others	 naturally	 looking	 to	 rectify	what	 they	 perceive	 as	 the	weaknesses	of	recent	historiographical	interpretations.	Daniel	T.	Orlovsky	made	some	early	headway	in	this	regard,	insofar	as	he	has	long	sought	to	shed	light	on	the	 ‘limits	 of	 reform’	 within	 certain	 Russian	 institutions	 and	 institutional	 life	both	 leading	 up	 to	 and	 across	 1917. 61 	J.	 Arch	 Getty	 has	 sparked	 some	controversy	in	his	book	Practicing	Stalinism,	which	picks	up	on	some	of	the	ideas	presented	in	Edward	Keenan’s	‘political	folkways’	article,	as	arguably	he	seeks	to	challenge	 the	 field,	 or	 remind	 it,	 of	 the	 need	 to	 incorporate	 structural	considerations	 into	 explanations	 of	 Russian	 political	 culture	 and	 Russian	perceptions	of	 leadership.62		 It	 remains	 to	be	 seen	how	 far	 the	 field	decides	 to	develop	 the	 specific	 arguments	 of	 these	 works	 in	 the	 coming	 years.	 But,	 with	studies	 such	 as	 Yanni	 Kotsonis’	 States	 of	 Obligation	 telling	 the	 history	 of	Russian/Soviet	 taxation	 as	 a	 modern	 development	 fundamentally	 shaped	 by	particular	priori	and	an	outlook	born	of	a	particular	local	context,	it	is	also	clear	that	many	 in	 the	 field	are	seeking	 to	 incorporate	a	reflexivity	 that	accounts	 for	some	of	 the	deeper	cultural	considerations	and	patterns	that	have	traditionally	fuelled	 structuralist	 thinking. 63 	Kotsonis	 seeks	 to	 reveal	 how	 engrained	determinates,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 certain	 cultural	 perspectives	 and	 established	sociological	 and	 philosophical	 preoccupations,	 interacted	 with	 and	 influenced	the	 development	 of	modern	 taxation	 policy	 in	 Russia	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 as	well	as	the	tools	of	state	required	to	enact	this	policy.64				It	might	also	be	said	that	scholars	such	as	Mark	D.	Steinberg,	Diane	P.	Koenker,	and	Boris	Kollonitskii	have	pursued	a	not	dissimilar	line	of	logic,	each	choosing																																																									60	Sewell,	Logics	of	History,	esp.	80,	273.	61	See	Daniel	T.	Orlovsky,	The	Limits	of	Reform:	The	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs	in	Imperial	Russia,	
1802-1881	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1981);	and	Orlovsky,	‘The	Hidden	Class:	White	Collar	Workers	in	the	Soviet	1920's’,	in	Making	Workers	Soviet	eds.	Lewis	H.	Siegelbaum	&	Ronald	Grigor	Suny	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	1995),	220-252.	62	J.	Arch	Getty,	Practicing	Stalinism:	Bolsheviks,	Boyars,	and	the	Persistence	of	Tradition	(New	Haven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press,	2013).	63	Yanni	Kotsonis,	States	of	Obligation:	Taxes	and	Citizenship	in	the	Russian	Empire	and	Early	
Soviet	republic	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2014),	chap.	10.	64	Kotsonis,	States	of	Obligation,	esp.	19-21,	295-296.	
to	 study	 the	 symbols	 and	 schemata	 through	which	 individuals	 interpreted	 the	world,	 lacing	 detailed	 personal	 experience,	 shared	 cultural	 connections,	 and	historical	development	through	their	studies.	By	studying	the	writings	of	worker	intellectuals	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 Steinberg	 has	 revealed	 the	layering	of	influences	that	came	to	make	these	modern	Russian	subjects.65	In	the	same	 vein,	 Koenker	 has	 explored	 the	 interaction	 between	 material	 reality,	established	 workers’	 culture,	 and	 ideological	 dreams.66	While	 Kollonitskii	 has	pioneered	 the	 use	 street	 culture	 and	 rumour	 as	 a	 means	 of	 tracing	 popular	responses	to	political	crisis,	revealing	how	revolutionary	messages	and	Russian	experiences	combined	to	make	the	social	atmosphere	that	helped	drive	forward	the	events	of	1917.67			One	way	or	another,	the	latest	scholarly	trends	in	the	field	of	Russian	and	Soviet	history	 are	 bound	 by	 a	 growing	 desire	 to	 eschew	 binary	 conceptions	 and	entrenched	 interpretive	 frameworks.	 Ideas	 and	 ideologies	 do	not	 function	 in	 a	vacuum,	 they	 exist	 in	 dialogue	 with	 the	 world	 around	 them.	 Looking	 at	 and	across	 the	 Russian	 Revolution,	 this	 is	 something	 that	 has	 become	 increasingly	apparent	 to	 those	 writing	 the	 history	 of	 this	 event	 and	 this	 period.	 A	crosspollination	of	approaches	and	the	pursuit	of	multicausal	explanations	have	begun	to	preoccupy	the	minds	of	many	within	the	field.	The	following	chapters	show	 how	 historians	 are	 getting	 to	 grips	 with	 these	 developments.	 Exploring	various	 contours	 of	 the	 Russian	 Revolution	 in	 a	 non-binary,	 chronologically	expansive	manner,	they	seek	to	further	facilitate	new	insights	in	the	field.			
Structure	of	the	Book	
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The	chapters	of	this	book	have	been	grouped	into	two	main	parts,	refelecting	the	different	 analytical	 focus	 the	 authors	 take	 to	 the	 study	 of	 the	 revolutionary	transformation	process.	The	first	section,	entitled	‘The	New	State,	the	Past,	and	
the	 People’,	 will	 examine	 how	 the	 new	 rulers	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 Bolsheviks,	attempted	to	reconfigure	political,	social,	and	cultural	practices	to	make	them	fit	their	 revolutionary	 ideals	 and	 how	 they	 dealt	 with	 the	 rapidly	 emerging	 civil	society	 they	 inherited.	 The	 section	 starts	 with	 a	 contribution	 by	 Arch	 Getty,	whose	chapter	examines	problem	of	persistence,	asking	the	important	questions	why,	 in	what	 form,	 and	 for	how	 long	pre-revolutionary	political	 edured	across	1917.	In	the	second	chapter,	Matt	Rendle’s	contribution	poses	the	question,	was	the	revolutionary	justice	system	introduced	by	the	Bolsheviks	in	November	1917	really	revolutionary?	He	explores	 the	extent	 to	which	 there	was	 continuity	and	change	in	legal	culture	and	practices.	The	third	piece	in	this	section,	written	by	Matthias	 Neumann,	 seeks	 to	 advance	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 ways	 the	Bolsheviks	constructed	a	Soviet	obshchestvennost’,	a	Soviet,	state-controlled,	civil	sphere.	Based	on	a	case	study	of	the	state-sponsored	Communist	Youth	League	(Komsomol),	 the	 piece	 will	 reveal	 whether	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 Soviet	
obshchestvennost'	 integrated	 forms	 and	 developments	 that	 emerged	 under	 the	tsarist	regime	to	create	a	‘managed	civil	society’.	In	the	final	chapter	of	this	part,	Miriam	Neirick	examines	the	power	of	pre-revolutionary	culture	in	her	study	of	the	 development	 of	 the	 Russian	 circus	 after	 1917.	 She	 shows	 that	 while	 the	Bolsheviks	 failed	 to	 prevent	 the	 restoration	 of	 the	 circus	 to	 pre-revolutionary	form	under	NEP,	the	discourse	on	the	 ideological	value	of	circus	entertainment	was	truly	revolutionised.		The	 second	 part,	 entitled	 ‘The	 People,	 the	 Past,	 and	 the	 New	 State’,	shifts	the	focus	more	firmly	to	the	people	and	the	way	individuals,	social	groups,	and	 professional	 groups	 encountered	 and	 engaged	 with	 the	 newly	 emerging	Soviet	 state.	 As	 well	 as	 engaging	 with	 the	 modern	 ideas	 promoted	 by	 the	Bolsheviks,	in	their	interaction	with	the	new	state	these	groups	and	individuals	naturally	reverted	to	traditional	paradigms	and	practices,	using	‘tools’	familiar	to	them	 from	 before	 1917.	 In	 the	 first	 chapter	 in	 this	 section,	 Matthew	 Pauly,	explores	 how	 Ukrainian	 teachers	 developed	 a	 notion	 of	 public	 service	 that	determined	their	politics	in	the	late	Imperial	period	and	how	they	subsequently	
adjusted	and	reconciled	their	own	vision	of	revolution	with	that	promoted	by	the	Soviet	state.	This	contribution	is	followed	by	a	chapter	on	the	‘women’s	question’	across	 the	 revolutionary	 divide.	 Yulia	 Gradskova	 examines	 the	 ideas	 and	practices	 of	 the	 emancipation	 of	women	 in	 the	 Volga-Ural	 region,	 highlighting	the	 independent	 initiative	taken	by	 local	 intellectuals	and	women	and	how	this	was	 incorporation	 into	 the	 wider	 Soviet	 campaign	 for	 the	 ‘solution	 of	 the	women’s	 question’	 after	 1917.	 The	 third	 contribution,	written	 by	 Susan	Grant,	puts	the	focus	on	another	professional	group	–	nurses.	Contrary	to	teachers,	the	tsarist-trained	 nurse	 lacked	 the	 protection	 of	 unionism	until	 August	 1917.	 But	Grant	 shows	how	nurses	 earned	 a	 Soviet	 identity	 through	professional	 service	and	 an	 overwhelming	 sense	 of	 respect	 for	 the	 pre-revolutionary	 past.	 The	traditions	of	pre-revolutionary	Russian	nursing	became	deeply	 enmeshed	with	Soviet	 medical	 care	 values	 and	 concepts	 of	 professionalism.	 In	 the	 next	contribution,	Vera	Kaplan	asks	the	intriguing	question:	‘What	did	historians	do	at	the	time	of	the	Great	Revolution?’	The	chapter	explores	the	personal	experience	of	 contemporary	historians	and	 the	 life	of	 the	historical	 community	during	 the	Revolution,	analysing	the	interactions	among	the	various	groups	composing	this	community.	Kaplan	demonstrates	how	 the	establishment	of	 the	Soviet	 archival	system	led	to	the	steady	erosion	of	the	pre-revolutionary	historical	community’s	autonomy.	 Finally,	 the	 section	 is	 completed	 by	 an	 article	 on	 pre-revolutionary	paradigms	in	citizen	humour	of	the	1930s.	In	it	Jonathan	Waterlow	reveals	that	while	 ordinary	 citizens	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 deal	 directly	 with	 the	 enormous	changes	of	 the	1930s,	 they	did	 so	with	 ‘tools’	 familiar	 to	 them	 from	before	 the	Revolution:	 these	 included	 recognisably	 pre-Soviet	 concepts,	 standards	 of	judgement,	unofficial	forms	of	language,	traditional	values	and	authority	figures.	Waterlow	 challenges	 the	 assumption	 that	 Soviet	 citizens	 were	 trapped	 within	official	Soviet	discourses,	unable	to	avoid	‘speaking	Bolshevik’.		
